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While affirming their more-than-human concerns, Ruddick (2015) proposes that there 
are limits to the capacity of relational ontologies to deal with the conflicting demands 
and extensive temporalities of the Anthropocene crisis. This commentary probes her 
alternative notions of a forcefulness and generativity that exceeds individuated bodies 
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Building on a number of earlier excursions into the political ontologies of Spinoza and 
Deleuze (2008, 2010), Susan Ruddick’s `Rethinking the subject, reimagining worlds’ 
(2015) both inherits and challenges the relational ontologies that have been gathering 
force in human geography and neighbouring disciplines over the last two decades or 
so.  It might feel as though the west’s centuries-old enthrallment to a human-nature 
divide has by now been well and truly displaced by a new set of ontological stories in 
which nature and society are understood to be mutually entangled and co-constitutive. 
But this is no time for theoretical complacency.  While affirming the new ontological 
`settlement’ in many ways, Ruddick expresses doubts about the capacity of the 
relational makeover of the nature-society dichotomy to fully account for events and 
processes `whose temporalities extend millennia even aeons beyond our prior 
imaginings’ (2015: 3). Taking the Anthropocene thesis as her incitement, she begins to 
lay out an alternative politics and ethics in which both force and signification are 
conceived as extending far beyond the bounds of any individuated being.  
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There’s a claim Ruddick makes about a tendency in relational ontological work to avail 
itself of the expanded sense of the subject offered by the embrace of the `more-than-
human’ without making corresponding concessions or sacrifices (2015: 11).  I suspect 
that this point has wider traction, not least in the reception of the Anthropocene thesis 
in certain strains of critical social thought. For many post-humanist scholars the 
scientific case for anthropogenic Earth system change is being taken as a vindication of 
the argument that no recourse can or ought to be made to a freestanding `Nature’ 
beyond the domain of human social existence. Quick to capitalise on the Anthropocene 
narrative of tightly coupled social systems and Earth systems, relational ontologists in 
particular now seem to be in a privileged position. Not only are they privy to a 
physico-material agency apparently disavowed in more discursive or linguistic styles 
of social thought, they also find themselves well placed to foreground the deep social-
structural divisions that are said to be passed over in more scientific constitutions of 
the Anthropos. 
 
But what does it mean – as an ontological and political provocation - for humankind 
(or part thereof) to be construed as geological agents?   Given that none of the social 
sciences have long-standing or even short-standing traditions for thinking deeply with 
or about geology, what exactly are our grounds for contributing usefully to debates 
over climate change, planetary boundaries or Earth system perturbations? Is it enough 
to identify the crucial social actors or isolate the social-structural determinants of 
`anthroposcenic’ agency and exposure?  The achievements to date of relational 
ontologies clearly have some purchase on the mutual implication of social and physical 
processes evidenced in Earth systems science.  But what do relational ontologists have 
to say about the abyssal reaches of geological time and dynamics– Ruddick’s point 
above about aeon-spanning temporalities - without which the eye-blink of the current 
epoch makes little sense at all?    
 
We can also play the geologic hand in the other direction. If the idea of humans 
`becoming geologic’ is challenging, what are social thinkers to make of earth processes 
that appear to be `becoming human’?  If the capacity of Earth systems to shift, 
recalibrate, reorder in response to human `drivers’ points to the messiness or mutability 
of the human-nonhuman interface, might this also have something say about the 
capabilities proper to the planet itself? Does the Earth need to `become human’ in 
order to express itself?  Or is critical thought – even after all its linguistic turning - still 
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too focused on sensations, meanings, negotiations in which it is presumed that we 
humans are the main event?  
 
For me, it is in her manoeuvring between a world of much more-than-human forces 
and an Earth that is itself communicative that Ruddick most troubles and provokes 
existing Anthropocene discourse.  While radical ecologists have long insisted that the 
living planet is meaningful in and of itself, and while natural scientists have compiled 
vast databases detailing the Earth system’s recalibrations in response to internal and 
external forcings, neither offers an explicit articulation of a planet that 
characteristically communicates with itself - an astronomical body that is its own 
messaging system. It is this sense of the Anthropocene as semiosis in Ruddick’s paper 
that want I focus on in what follows, after first looking more closely at her critical 
engagement with relational ontology. 
 
Commenting a few years ago on Antonio Negri’s engagement with Spinoza, Ruddick 
affirmed the broad intentions and spirit of the Italian political philosophers `joyful’ 
elaboration on the Spinozist notion of power, before adding:   `it is nonetheless 
frustrating in that it leaves unasked, and consequently unanswered, questions regarding 
difficult divisions, conflicts or divergent agendas in this process’  (2010: 40).  In the 
current paper we find a similar tone of affirmation coupled with frustration in regard to 
the claims of relational ontologies. While sharing the wish of such approaches to 
extend the scope of political and ethical relating beyond the bounds of our own species, 
Ruddick questions whether their privileging of attentive, caring, and convivial 
coexistence with nonhuman others can handle the surge of competing demands for 
attention and the extent or depth of strife sparked by the current planetary predicament 
(2015: 4-5).   
 
In her view, one of the limits of much work in the relational ontological vein is that its 
attempts to stretch affective and generative `becomings’ beyond the bounds of the 
human have tended to hinge on encounters between members of our own species and 
other living beings who find themselves physically proximate to one another.  While 
this displaces the idea of an autonomous `stand alone’ human subject with more 
collaborative subjectivities, she argues, it still implies that one of the partners in the 
relationship is always `us’. Moreover, despite – or by virtue of  - a commitment to 
mutual transformation, the focus remains individuated entities (Ruddick, 2015: 2). In 
other words, for Ruddick, there is a tendency in relational ontologies to want to enrich 
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enhance and extend processes of subject formation while holding on to the coherence 
and integrity of the organism.  Thus `a humanist theory of the subject…. is never fully 
relinquished, but only extended to non-human others’ (2015: 11). 
 
We might anticipate that actor network theorists, among others, would retort that both 
their networks and their relata are always already constituted through transactions with 
multiple others.  But it is notable that even in the offerings of ANT, it is rare to find 
sustained inquiry into situations that do not include humans as significant partners, just 
as it is rare across the broader sweep of relational ontologies to find deep engagement 
with forces, conjunctions and generative powers that operate beyond the bounds of 
living bodies.  It is in this sense that Ruddick draws on Spinozist and Deleuzian 
notions of affect `that downplay( ) the organism’ (2015: 10)  - an approach that 
resonates with recent work by Claire Colebrook (2010: 77).  If Spinoza provides a 
vision of composite bodies whose form and potentiality emerge out of conjoining of 
powers or forces, Ruddick takes from Deleuze an extrapolation of this becoming with 
and through heterogeneous bodies beyond the human domain.  
 
But the importance of creative forces that precede and exceed the organic body is only 
half of the story.  What also interests Ruddick are the ways in which force itself might 
be imbued with capacities most often confined by critical thinkers to our own species 
(or at best the uppermost branches of the animal kingdom). It is in this regard that she 
turns to the Charles Sanders Pierce’s positing of more-than-human semiosis (2015: 13-
18).  What Ruddick finds in the work of the pragmatist philosopher is the pioneering 
proposition that constitutive exchanges between bodies entail relationships that are as 
much about signification as they are about force.  Pierce, she insists, does the 
groundwork for a theory of sign-play or communication that extends far beyond inter-
human exchanges to take in transactions between other life forms and even amongst 
the non-living: `In the Peircean formulation, meaning-factors are at work across the 
entire universe of things’ (Ruddick, 2015: 15). In this sense, for Ruddick, becomings 
that are too often reduced to relationships between organisms and their environment 
can be reconstrued not only in terms of more dispersed activations of matter-energy, 
but as semiotic negotiations. `Here, over a long time frame,’ she writes, `the complex 
adjustments between organic and inorganic matter might be considered a kind of 
communication, imbued with meaning factors’ (2015:15). 
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It is this thinking beyond the organism in terms of both force and semiosis that for me 
makes for such an intriguing and original conceptualisation of the Anthropocene.   For 
Ruddick, the predicament of the Anthropocene is not only one of human `forcings’ 
impacting on the dynamics of the  ecological and Earth systems. It is also about the 
interruption or over-coding of established pathways of communication: the scrambling 
of a whole range of geoclimatic, chemical or biotic messages that orchestrate the 
hatching, mating, feeding, resting or migrating patterns of living beings. As Ruddick 
explains:  
 
Disruption of visual, auditory, olfactory, electromagnetic and other cues 
in the landscape influence the behaviors of animals and organisms in 
broadly defined geo-systems: our knowledge of perceptual cues (or 
meaning factors) is increasingly important as logging, mining, urban and 
other developments alter textual cues of the landscape (2015:18). 
 
In Ruddick’s broader picture, it would appear, it is this planet-wide meshwork of 
messaging - as much as any material-energetic forcefulness  - that grants the Earth its 
systemicity, its dynamics, its state-shifting capacities. Critical social analysis of 
climatology and Earth system science has often evinced a deep suspicion of efforts to 
model earth processes in their totality  - on account of the way that technological 
prostheses enable an imagining of the Earth from an abstracted, placeless `beyond’.   
Part of the appeal to me of Ruddick’s notion of an auto-communicative planetarity is 
that it unsettles the idea that human-driven informationalization of the Earth is a 
dangerous supplement to the planet’s own groundedness and self-consistency.  In its 
place, we are offered an Earth that is always already communicating with itself:  
transmitting, receiving, calculating, auto-affecting.  After all, it might be added, 
modelling the impact of increasing greenhouse gas emission on global climate only 
makes sense on the back of an understanding that the Earth system is constantly 
recalibrating itself with every new emission. 
 
In this way, Ruddick’s material-semiotic vision of the planet resonates with some rare 
extrapolations of Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive logic into the realms of the 
geophysical. Vicki Kirby (1997, 2011), in particular, has long insisted that the 
troubling of the duality of force and signification was always intended by Derrida to be 
extended far beyond the domain of human communication (and in this regard its worth 
recalling that an affirmative reading of Pierce is shared reference point in the work of 
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Deleuze and Derrida). For Kirby, it is not only that the `telling flesh’ of living 
organisms that is imbued with messaging capabilities, but that the Earth and cosmos 
ought to be seen as compendia of communicative capacities. As well as evoking the 
`spooky action at a distance’ that physicists have discerned at the quantum scale 
(Einstein cited in Kirby 2011: 126), she explores lightning’s uncanny `awareness’ of 
topographic high points in its passage from sky to earth - and draws our attention to 
way that the overall balance of positive/negative electrical valences of the Earth’s 
entire atmosphere is recomputed with every single lightning strike (2011: 10-12). In 
this regard, Kirby proposes that `what we conventionally call Nature is as actively 
literate, numerate, and inventive as anything we might include within Culture’ (2011: 
66). And she goes on to wonder whether such self-sensing could be considered `as the 
Earth’s own scientific investigations of itself’ (2011: 34). 
 
Such incitements to think force and signification together also have repercussions for 
the way we think about the origins of the ecological and Earth systemic ruptures 
currently being shorthanded by the Anthropocene concept. Whereas scientific causal 
accounts have generally fallen back on quite conventional notions of socio-technical 
turning points and linear growth curves, and while critical social science originary 
stories seem oddly reluctant to stray far from received social-structural or `political’ 
narratives, an Earth imagined as always already computing, conversing and negotiating 
with itself raises some provocative possibilities.   The claim that our own species – or 
at least significant fractions of the human collective – are capable of interrupting or 
overwriting the messaging capabilities of biotic and Earth systems raises questions 
about the source of such communicative scrambling. Is it only our own species that 
messes with planetary signifying processes?  Or are Earth systems - or the various 
components and sub-divisions of the planet - themselves capable of shortfalls in 
communication, of misinterpreting or over-reacting to signals? (cf Ruddick, 2015: 17).  
 
This might be one reading, for example, of the Derridean structural logic of the trace - 
which proposes that any entity that harbours non-identity within itself has the capacity 
to turn against itself (Derrida, 1981: 119).  In his later work, Derrida developed this 
train of analysis into the notion of autoimmunization: the idea that any system or being 
which has the ability to modulate the flows between its own interior and the world 
beyond also contains the possibility of misreading vital signs.   Or in his own words: 
`… this strange illogical logic by which a living being can spontaneously destroy, in an 
autonomous fashion, the very thing within it that is supposed to protect it against the 
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other, to immunize it against the aggressive intrusion of the other’ (Derrida: 2005: 
123).  Although not pursuing the idea, Derrida himself suggested that this dynamic 
might be extended to `the fragile destiny of the planet’ (2005: 117; see also Clark, 
2012: 273). 
 
However far we chose to push such provocations, what Ruddick shares with both 
Kirby and Colebrook is a sense that one of the problems with recent relational 
ontologies is that they have tended to conceive of themselves  - usually in explicit 
contradistinction a perceived prevalence of more discursive, cultural or linguistic 
approaches – as materialisms. And in this way, they foreclose on important theoretical 
resources for deconstructing or otherwise negotiating the matter-ideality divide – a 
duality that may well be more deeply-engrained and more pressing than the human-
nonhuman rift.  As Elizabeth Grosz has recently added, reviewing a cast of 
philosophical figures that includes Spinoza, Deleuze and Pierce’s compatriot 
pragmatist William James: `each of these philosophers, while appearing to be 
materialists, and addressing questions about the world through materialism, remain 
attached to a concept of the ideal, ideality, or conceptuality that is irreducible to 
anything material’ (2014: unpag.). 
 
Following Ruddick’s reading, then, the imputing of properties of communicability to 
the geophysical Earth might help free certain relational ontologies from their vitalist 
enthralment with the organism – thus relieving entities, fields or systems of the need to 
be human-like or even life-like in order to be articulate.  At the same time, working the 
semiotic-material conjuncture from the other direction suggests a geology or a 
minerality that is proper to the living being (see Clark, 2012).  It raises the possibility 
that `life itself’ might be imbued with an essential - though not necessary stable – 
materiality: the kind of base matter that is often passed over in post humanist thought 
in favour of affirming the endless malleability of biological becoming. In this sense, 
the `becoming geologic’ of human actors implied in the Anthropocene thesis might 
gesture not only `outward’ toward the forcing of Earth systems by the powers of social 
agency, but also draw our attention to the potentiality of the earthy matter enfolded 
within the collective and individuated bodies of our species.   As Kathryn Yusoff puts 
it, it points towards a geology that is no longer `bracketed out from subjective 
experience or placed outside the corporeal body’ (2015: 6). 
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If there is at once a human geology – an elementality with its own forceful and 
generative logic at work within our very being - and a semiosis with its own complex 
and perhaps contrary logic at work all the way up to the planetary scale  –we can begin 
to see why critical social thought ought to resist scoring easy points off the 
Anthropocene.  No less than natural scientists or more cultural and linguistically 
oriented social scientists, social thinkers of a relational ontological leaning still have a 
lot to learn.  By the same token, we can start to see the sheer scale and perplexity of the 
ethical-political challenge Ruddick sets herself.  She is keen that extending the scope 
of politics and ethics far beyond the human and the organismic does not result in 
dissipation into ineffectuality (2015: 2), to ensure that - to borrow a formulation from 
Hayden Lorimer - `what emerges is not simply a smear of equivalence’ (Lorimer, 
2005: 88).  She is likewise attentive to the inverse possibility, discernable in much 
stridently radical or progressive engagement, of an investment in power imbalances 
seen to be so deeply incised as to appear insurmountable (Ruddick, 2008: 2600). 
Ruddick’s alternative, elaborating on Spinoza’s notion of potentia, involves making 
informed, inspired but tough choices about what nonhuman forces we ally ourselves 
with so as best to power or energise our contests with the all-too-human entrenchments 
of political power (2015: 18-19).  
 
This is clearly a project without templates or guarantees.  The drive to promote 
collaborations that enhance our capacities and to resist entanglements that sap our 
energies comes with no dependable guidebook. For in a volatile world what may be 
empowering in one moment or context may be a hindrance in another. Ruddick’s 
ambitious manoeuvring between force and signification does not make these decisions 
any easier, especially if we also seek to account for the indeterminacy that 
characterises any signifying process: opportunities for misreading, slippery translation 
and overreaction that may inhere not only in human sociality but in the Earth’s own 
interactions with itself. It would seem that the best we can hope for is interminable 
experimentation – trials that are inextricably material and communicative. As Ruddick 
has earlier observed  `For Deleuze the genesis of thought is not a model of the same, 
but a co-creation of something unforeseen, a ‘long-lasting affair with experimentation’’ 
(2010: 36).  Much the same would seem to apply to the political and ethical 
possibilities sketched out in the current paper.  
 
More surely, what Ruddick helps us to see is that Anthropocene is not simply a 
problem any of us can solve.   If human agency is implicated in and subtended by 
 9 
earthly dynamics whose force and significance stretches across geological time, the 
predicament signposted by the Anthropocene is not simply ours to comprehend, undo 
or recompose. While it is important that critical social thinkers keep reminding us of 
the inequalities and divisions that sunder the Anthropos, it is just as crucial that we 
consider the contribution of turbulent and mutable Earth processes to the differences 
within our species being.   And indeed, if we follow Ruddick’s suggestion that this is a 
planet that queries, computes and converses, we might even wonder whether such a 
differentiated humanity is itself one possible answer to conundrums posed by a 
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